Confucius Institutes as Instruments of Strategic Influence: Trojan Horses for Intelligence and Elite Capture in the Americas

Jose Adan Gutierrez, Senior Fellow, MSI²

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“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme act of war.”

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 3: Attack by Stratagem

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Abstract

China’s Confucius Institutes (CIs), established under the guise of cultural exchange and language learning, have rapidly expanded into more than 160 countries since 2004. While publicly branded as benign centers of education, a deeper investigation reveals that they often function as strategic tools for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Beyond influencing foreign narratives, these institutes provide China’s intelligence services with sustained, institutional access to students, professors, journalists, and future leaders, laying the groundwork for long-term recruitment and elite capture.

This paper examines the evolution of CIs globally and in Latin America, highlighting their utility in shaping public discourse, grooming sympathetic influencers, and subtly undermining academic independence. As China courts journalists with all-expenses-paid trips despite its internal repression of the press, the West must confront the contradiction: authoritarian soft power can be anything but soft. The United States must view Confucius Institutes as national security concerns and reinvest in its own public diplomacy to compete in the contest for global influence.

Introduction

Confucius Institutes (CIs), first launched by China in 2004, are officially presented as centers for Chinese language instruction and cultural exchange. Operating through partnerships with foreign academic institutions, they’ve established a presence in over 160 countries, often welcomed for their generous funding and expanding educational opportunities (Peterson et al., 2017; Myers, 2024). However, intelligence professionals and academic watchdogs have increasingly viewed these institutions not merely as educational tools but as state-sponsored access points to identify, cultivate, and groom future sympathizers and potential assets (Zuppello, 2024; Wray, 2018).

In the Americas—especially in Latin America—the proliferation of CIs has been notable. As Chinese influence has grown through trade, infrastructure, and diplomacy, cultural platforms like CIs have helped reinforce Beijing’s soft power while also laying long-term groundwork for intelligence and ideological influence. This paper analyzes the multifaceted functions of Confucius Institutes, with particular focus on Latin America, where the openness of democratic institutions and the lack of alternatives have made these Chinese-sponsored centers uniquely influential.

Origins and Expansion: A Platform for Cultural Diplomacy—And Beyond

CIs were modeled after Western cultural organizations such as France’s Alliance Française and Germany’s Goethe-Institut, but they are structurally and politically different: they are wholly state-funded and embedded within China’s propaganda and intelligence ecosystem (Peterson et al., 2017). Overseen originally by Hanban and now by the Center for Language Education and Cooperation (CLEC), these institutes are linked directly to the Chinese Ministry of Education and, by extension, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideological apparatus (Gao, 2020).

By 2019, China operated more than 500 Confucius Institutes and 1,000 Confucius Classrooms worldwide. This global network offers more than Mandarin classes: it provides the CCP with a means to shape perceptions of China abroad, push pro-Beijing narratives, and most critically, cultivate future elites under friendly auspices (Zuppello, 2024). Intelligence recruiting is not an overnight transaction—it is a long game. These institutes are ideal for “spotting and assessing” future journalists, academics, bureaucrats, and decision-makers, especially those showing early interest in China and global affairs (Wray, 2018; Myers, 2024).

Li Changchun, then CCP propaganda chief, admitted in 2009 that CIs are “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup” (Peterson et al., 2017). While framed as soft power, they are more accurately described as strategic penetration tools designed to shape elite opinion, facilitate indirect intelligence collection, and exert long-term influence.

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Credit: Adobe Stock- Standard license on file.

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Strategic Concerns: Intelligence Tradecraft Disguised as Cultural Exchange

Multiple areas of concern reinforce the idea that CIs serve purposes beyond pedagogy:

Cultivation of Future Assets and Sympathizers

Confucius Institutes provide Chinese state-linked entities with long-term access to students, educators, and institutional leaders, often during formative phases of their careers. From the perspective of intelligence tradecraft, such prolonged exposure allows Chinese actors to assess individuals for ideological alignment, susceptibility to flattery or incentives, or future usefulness as policy influencers (Wray, 2018; Myers, 2024). The concept of “elite capture”—grooming future journalists, think tank analysts, or even politicians—fits well within the mandate of many CI-related activities.

As Zuppello (2024) notes, the Chinese government has used Confucius Institutes and sponsored exchange programs in Latin America to identify promising local figures. Many students receive scholarships to study in China, where they are exposed to state-approved narratives and networks. Upon return, these alumni often rise into professional or academic roles, carrying with them an embedded, and sometimes unexamined, sympathy for Chinese perspectives.

Soft Power with Sharp Edges: Journalists and Influencers as Targets

One of the most troubling developments is China’s targeting of foreign journalists. Despite maintaining one of the world’s most repressive media environments at home, the Chinese state regularly invites journalists from Latin America and Africa on luxurious, all-expenses-paid visits to China—a tactic known to seasoned intelligence officials as grooming or “hospitality recruitment” (Peterson et al., 2017). These trips often include curated tours, access to “model” cities, and meetings with preselected thought leaders. The goal is to create a cadre of foreign journalists who are not just neutral toward China but actively sympathetic—or at least silent in the face of abuses.

This influence operation takes advantage of information asymmetry: journalists leave with favorable impressions shaped by controlled experiences, often unaware that they are being manipulated. In turn, they may publish articles or commentaries that echo CCP narratives, effectively becoming “multipliers” of Chinese strategic messaging in their home countries.

Institutional Leverage and Academic Self-Censorship

At many universities, Confucius Institutes are embedded in departments or programs that are underfunded. This financial dependency, combined with formal agreements that often require alignment with Chinese law or approval of teaching content, leads to subtle but significant restrictions on academic freedom (AAUP, 2014). Topics like Taiwan, Tibet, the Tiananmen massacre, or human rights abuses are systematically excluded from curricula.

Moreover, U.S. investigations revealed that some CI contracts required institutions to keep details confidential, further shielding the institute’s operations from oversight (U.S. GAO, 2023). In some cases, local faculty were discouraged from holding events critical of China, fearing they might jeopardize institutional ties or funding. This chilling effect undermines not just individual rights but the broader mission of higher education.

Case Study: Confucius Institutes in Latin America

In Latin America and the Caribbean, more than 45 Confucius Institutes currently operate across over 20 countries, with Brazil alone hosting 12 (Myers, 2024). The CI footprint in this region correlates closely with China’s rising investment, trade, and diplomatic activity. For instance, CIs were established quickly after countries like Panama, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing.

While the academic benefits are real, the strategic implications are often overlooked:

• Grooming local elites: Confucius Institutes in Brazil and Mexico regularly invite local officials, professors, and journalists to China, cultivating pro-Beijing networks (Zuppello, 2024).

• Supporting broader propaganda campaigns: During the COVID-19 pandemic, several Latin American CIs disseminated material praising China’s pandemic response while omitting its cover-up of the virus’s origins.

• Shaping educational ecosystems: In countries with few resources for Asian language education, CIs often become the sole gatekeepers of information about China, giving them disproportionate influence over what students learn—and don’t learn—about a rising global power.

China’s Defense: Cultural Outreach or Calculated Strategy?

Beijing defends CIs as no different from other cultural institutes, citing the British Council or Alliance Française as examples (Gao, 2020). However, these comparisons falter when considering China’s track record of press censorship, academic repression, and information control. China is not a country that values free expression—yet it goes to great lengths to court foreign professors, students, and journalists. The question is not whether China has the right to promote its culture, but whether these promotions serve strategic and intelligence purposes disguised as pedagogy.

The lack of public evidence tying CIs directly to espionage misses the point: intelligence influence operations are designed to operate in the gray zone, beneath the threshold of overt illegality. Their success is measured not by secrets stolen but by minds influenced and narratives shifted.

Sidebar: Current Status of Confucius Institutes in the United States

As of 2025, only a small number of Confucius Institutes (CIs) remain operational in the United States, a dramatic decline from the more than 100 that once existed. This contraction follows a wave of closures prompted by growing scrutiny from U.S. policymakers, concerns over academic freedom, and provisions in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act that restrict federal funding to institutions hosting active CIs (National Association of Scholars [NAS], 2020; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine [NASEM], 2023).

According to the most recent comprehensive survey by the National Academies, seven CIs remain active in the United States:

1. San Diego Global Knowledge University (California) – This institute continued operations after being transferred from San Diego State University in 2019. It offers Chinese language and culture programming (NASEM, 2023).

2. Pacific Lutheran University (Washington) – While specific program details are limited, this CI is confirmed to be active and likely supports typical CI language and culture courses (NASEM, 2023).

3. Troy University (Alabama) – Listed as active, though its program offerings have not been publicly detailed (NASEM, 2023).

4. Webster University (Missouri) – Hosts an operational CI with expected language and cultural education components (NASEM, 2023).

5. Wesleyan College (Georgia) – Took over CI operations previously hosted by Kennesaw State University and continues to offer Confucius programming (NAS, 2021).

6. Confucius Institute of the State of Washington (Seattle area) – A statewide initiative still in operation, providing educational outreach beyond a single campus (NASEM, 2023).

7. Alfred University (New York) – Though originally a major participant in CI activities and even co-hosted technical research with a Chinese partner, Alfred University officially closed its Confucius Institute in mid-2023 under congressional pressure due to concerns about dual-use research and national security risks (House Select Committee on the CCP, 2023).

Many former host universities have transitioned to alternative arrangements, including new China-focused cultural centers that do not bear the Confucius Institute label but maintain language instruction and academic exchanges. While Chinese cultural education persists, U.S. institutions are increasingly distancing themselves from direct financial and administrative ties with Hanban (now the Center for Language Education and Cooperation), the Chinese government agency formerly responsible for the CI network.

This sharp decline in CI presence reflects both rising geopolitical tensions and a reevaluation of how foreign cultural influence intersects with national security, transparency, and institutional autonomy in the U.S. higher education system.

www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/upload/confucius-institutes.pdf

Conclusion: Soft Power Is More Power Than Soft

Confucius Institutes, like many other Chinese state-linked entities operating abroad, are examples of “soft” tools with hard strategic intent. They offer language classes and cultural events, but also facilitate long-term influence operations. These centers allow Chinese intelligence services and political organs to assess, shape, and build relationships with foreign elites at the earliest stages of their careers.

Latin America has proven a fertile ground for such operations, with little resistance and considerable success in shaping local discourse and elite networks. As Beijing continues to court journalists, professors, and students—while silencing the same professions at home—the contradiction becomes a warning: cultural diplomacy from an authoritarian regime must never be accepted at face value.

For the United States, this means taking soft power seriously—not only countering Confucius Institutes where appropriate, but investing in credible, transparent alternatives. Funding independent Mandarin language programs, supporting journalism education, and expanding Fulbright-style scholarships across the Americas are steps in the right direction.

A key partner in this endeavor is Taiwan. As a vibrant democracy that also shares Chinese language and cultural heritage, Taiwan is uniquely positioned to offer an alternative to Beijing’s tightly controlled version of “cultural outreach.” Taiwan can collaborate with reputable think tanks and academic institutions across the Americas to establish independent Mandarin language and cultural education programs, ones free from the ideological censorship and geopolitical agenda of the Chinese Communist Party. A Taiwan-backed initiative would promote genuine cultural understanding rather than narrative control, and empower students to learn about Chinese civilization without being fed propaganda.

Above all, Washington must recognize that the battle for global influence is not only fought in boardrooms or at summits—it is waged in classrooms, campus auditoriums, and press junkets. If left uncontested, Confucius Institutes will continue to shape the narratives of a generation of global leaders—leaders who may one day set policy with Beijing’s perspective already embedded in their worldview. A robust partnership with Taiwan offers a principled, democratic counterweight—one that supports freedom of thought while preserving access to one of the world’s most important cultures and languages.

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References

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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).