🇺🇲 Cuba as a Platform for Strategic Friction: The Caribbean Flank in the Contest Between Washington and Beijing Over Taiwan

Dr. Rafael Marrero, President, Founder, and Chief Economist, MSI² & Dr. Luis O. Noguerol, Co-Founder and Senior Analyst, MSI²

At the end of 2025, the White House published a new National Security Strategy that repositioned the Western Hemisphere as a strategic priority, with an explicit emphasis on readjusting military presence in response to threats “in our hemisphere” while simultaneously deterring a high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific, particularly around Taiwan (The White House, 2025; Congressional Research Service, 2025). Days later, Beijing released its third official policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, a broad document that normalizes a sustained expansion of diplomatic, economic, technological, and security ties in the region (Berg, 2025). In January 2026, the capture of Nicolás Maduro in Caracas during U.S. military operations introduced a shock factor that altered regional calculations regarding risks, alignments, and Washington’s thresholds for action (PBS NewsHour, 2026).

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Within this triangle of events, Cuba once again occupies a sensitive position. Not due to Cold War nostalgia, but because of its value in an era defined by data, telecommunications, intelligence, and logistics. The underlying question is not whether “1962 returns,” but whether the Caribbean flank can become an indirect lever in the strategic competition between the United States and China, at a moment when Taiwan remains the point of greatest global friction.

Main Conclusion Upfront (BLUF)

The combination of (1) a U.S. doctrine that once again prioritizes the hemisphere, (2) a Chinese strategy that institutionalizes its presence in Latin America and the Caribbean, and (3) an operational demonstration of U.S. resolve in Venezuela in January 2026 creates an environment in which Cuba can function as an observation point, technological platform, and instrument of strategic signaling. In a structural competition with China, where Taiwan is the core, Beijing may seek advantage by raising economic, political, and informational costs in the immediate neighborhood of the United States, using persistent tools such as digital infrastructure, economic influence, and intelligence collection rather than visible military gestures (The White House, 2025; Funaiole et al., 2024; Shatz et al., 2025).

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Analytical Framework: The Noguerol-Marrero Doctrine

To interpret this environment, it is useful to apply the Noguerol-Marrero Doctrine, which holds that contemporary strategic competition unfolds predominantly below the threshold of armed conflict through the persistent integration of digital infrastructure, intelligence access, economic dependence, deterrence economics, and narrative control. The objective is not direct confrontation, but rather shaping the adversary’s incentives, constraining its decision space, and progressively increasing escalation costs without resorting to the open use of force (Noguerol & Marrero, 2026).

Within this framework, deterrence economics refers to the deliberate use of economic exposure, technological dependencies, market access, financing, and logistical chains to influence a rival’s strategic behavior. Deterrence is no longer based exclusively on military threats, but on the ability to impose cumulative economic and political costs that alter the adversary’s rational calculus.

1. The New U.S. Framework: The Hemisphere as a Theater of Competition

The 2025 National Security Strategy presents a straightforward logic: reinforce strategic control of the neighborhood, reduce vulnerabilities, and reposition resources to confront great-power competition (The White House, 2025). The Congressional Research Service underscores that the document calls for readjusting global military presence to address urgent threats in the hemisphere while preserving deterrence capacity vis-à-vis China over Taiwan (Congressional Research Service, 2025). Brookings interprets this NSS as a doctrinal shift that reorders priorities and hardens views on spheres of influence, with clear operational implications (Daalder et al., 2025).

This framing directly links the Indo-Pacific with the Western Hemisphere: if Taiwan represents the primary strategic risk, the hemispheric rear cannot be left exposed to surveillance platforms, logistical choke points, or technological dependencies that could complicate a major crisis.

2. The Chinese Framework: Institutionalization of Influence

China is not improvising its relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean. Its third official policy toward the region codifies objectives and mechanisms that include economic cooperation, connectivity, political coordination, and technological expansion, using language that demands respect for its “core interests” (Berg, 2025). From the perspective of the Noguerol-Marrero Doctrine, this strategy seeks to transform economic integration into structural leverage capable of generating political and strategic costs for third parties at critical moments.

On the technological front, influence is consolidated through systems such as networks, standards, digital platforms, and industrial ecosystems. As specialized literature warns, those who finance, connect, and digitize ultimately influence how governance and decision-making occur (Díaz, 2025).

3. Venezuela 2026: Operational Shock and Strategic Signal

The capture of Maduro, documented by PBS as the culmination of an escalation, marks a regional inflection point. The United States demonstrates its capacity for direct action and reduces ambiguity regarding its willingness to act in the hemisphere when it perceives accumulated strategic threats (PBS NewsHour, 2026).

This message is not directed solely at Caracas. In a systemic competition, the signal is also sent to external actors that invest in, finance, or enable parallel power structures in the region. Recent analyses emphasize that the Venezuelan case should not be understood solely as a transnational crime problem, but as a front where maritime power, financial dependence, and external technological enablement converge (Gutiérrez et al., 2025; Pérez, 2025).

4. Cuba: Modern Relevance Through Intelligence and Proximity

Cuba enters this analysis with renewed analytical weight. In 2024, CSIS published evidence based on satellite imagery and technical assessments of installations in Cuba likely linked to Chinese intelligence collection efforts, with direct implications for U.S. security (Funaiole et al., 2024). In a competitive strategic environment, a signals collection platform close to U.S. continental territory does not require visible deployments to alter the balance; improving visibility, shortening decision cycles, and raising operational costs is sufficient.

Under the Noguerol-Marrero Doctrine, this type of indirect friction is precisely the mechanism through which adversary behavior is shaped without resorting to open military escalation.

5. Infrastructure and Routes: The Strategic Rear

In Latin America and the Caribbean, infrastructure is not neutral. Ports, telecommunications, energy, and digital platforms can acquire dual-use value. The case of Panama illustrates how logistical and port connectivity becomes a critical factor in strategic rivalry (Gutiérrez, 2025).

The conclusion is clear: if the center of gravity lies in the Indo-Pacific, the Western Hemisphere functions as a strategic rear. A rear with compromised critical nodes is, by definition, vulnerable.

6. Taiwan and Indirect Pressure

RAND has developed contingency scenarios in which deterrence includes coordinated economic tools with allies to raise the costs of Chinese aggression against Taiwan (Shatz et al., 2025). Within this framework, competition is not confined to a single front. China can seek an advantage by expanding pressure in areas where the United States has political and geographic sensitivity, such as the Caribbean, without the need for military escalation.

This is why Cuba matters. Not as a historical symbol, but as a modern variable within a deterrence equation that combines military power, economics, information, and influence.

Three Key Conclusions

1. The United States has once again declared the Western Hemisphere a priority front, directly linking it to deterrence vis-à-vis Taiwan (The White House, 2025; Congressional Research Service, 2025).

2. China has institutionalized its strategy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, confirming that the region is part of its global architecture of influence (Berg, 2025).

3. Cuba is relevant due to its capabilities and proximity, particularly in an environment where intelligence, telecommunications, and economic costs can generate indirect strategic friction (Funaiole et al., 2024).

Why This Matters

Because the next major global contest will not be decided solely in the Taiwan Strait. It will also be decided by the United States’ ability to secure its strategic rear, reduce economic vulnerabilities, and prevent external actors from turning the Caribbean into a space of surveillance, influence, and cumulative political costs. In the twenty-first century, deterrence is military, but also economic, informational, and structural.

Sidebar #1

Cuba and Taiwan: Strategic Tradeoffs in the U.S.–China Rivalry

The recent capture of Nicolás Maduro and his wife following a precise U.S. military operation in Venezuela significantly altered the strategic calculus in the Western Hemisphere. The message was unmistakable: Washington is prepared to act decisively to protect its immediate strategic environment. At the same time, China is increasing pressure on Taiwan while challenging U.S. interests across Latin America and the Caribbean.

From the Noguerol-Marrero perspective, this rivalry is not expressed through explicit exchanges or negotiated concessions, but through structural tradeoffs managed via deterrence economics. Taiwan concentrates global military and economic risk, while Cuba concentrates strategic friction driven by geographic proximity.

For the United States, the central tradeoff lies in securing the hemispheric rear in order to sustain deterrence in Asia, while accepting diplomatic and regional management costs. For China, the tradeoff involves applying persistent structural pressure in the hemisphere through economic, technological, and informational influence.

There is no territorial bargain. What exists is an equilibrium that shapes strategic decision-making.

Sidebar #2

Narcoterrorism and Deterrence Economics: Hemispheric Deterrence in Action

The new U.S. policy targeting drug cartels, fentanyl trafficking, and narcoterrorism is not merely a criminal justice or public health response. It is a central instrument of hemispheric strategic deterrence. By elevating these illicit networks to the level of national security threats, Washington expands its legal, operational, and political latitude to impose structural costs within its immediate strategic environment.

Under the Noguerol-Marrero Doctrine, narcotrafficking functions as a parallel economy that erodes sovereignty, weakens states, and creates dependency spaces where external actors can operate with greater freedom. Deterrence economics applied to narcoterrorism seeks precisely this outcome: destroying the profitability of the criminal model, severing financial flows, raising logistical risks, and eliminating zones of impunity.

The capture of Nicolás Maduro served as a demonstrative case. It not only dismantled a political node linked to illicit economies, but also sent a clear regional signal: regimes that tolerate, facilitate, or benefit from narcoterrorism will face escalating costs. Within this framework, the fight against fentanyl becomes an instrument to secure the hemispheric rear and constrain vectors of extra-hemispheric influence.

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References

Berg, R. C. (2025, December 18). China’s third policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean: Expanding influence and ambitions. Center for Strategic and International Studies.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-third-policy-paper-latin-america-and-caribbean-expanding-influence-and-ambitions

Congressional Research Service. (2025, December 18). National Security Strategy: Potential implications for DOD (IF13137). Congressional Research Service.
https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF13137

Daalder, I., Chollet, D., & Indyk, M. (2025, December 8). Breaking down Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy. Brookings Institution.
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/breaking-down-trumps-2025-national-security-strategy/

Diaz, A. A. (2025, March 20). La expansión tecnológica de China y la adquisición estratégica de propiedad intelectual. Diario Las Américas.
https://www.diariolasamericas.com/mundo/la-expansion-tecnologica-china-y-la-adquisicion-estrategica-propiedad-intelectual-n5373188

Funaiole, M., Hill, I., & Lin, B. (2024, December 6). China’s intelligence footprint in Cuba: New evidence and implications for U.S. security. Center for Strategic and International Studies.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security

Gutiérrez, J. A. (2025, May 25). Panama: A strategic battleground in the U.S.–China rivalry. Substack.
https://substack.com/home/post/p-164429363

Gutiérrez, J. A., Pérez, O., & Marrero, R. (2025, October 18). Gunboat diplomacy revisited: U.S. naval power, hemispheric history, and the China factor in the Venezuelan standoff. Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute.
https://miastrategicintel.com/gunboat-diplomacy-revisited-u-s-naval-power-hemispheric-history-and-the-china-factor-in-the-venezuelan-standoff/

Noguerol, L. O., & Marrero, R. (2026). Dragon in the Matrix: Technical realities of Chinese cyber operations targeting the West. Bravo Zulu Publishers. Amazon Digital Services.
https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0GCBHW24N

PBS NewsHour. (2026). A timeline of U.S. military escalation against Venezuela leading to Maduro’s capture. PBS NewsHour.
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-timeline-of-u-s-military-escalation-against-venezuela-leading-to-maduros-capture

Pérez, O. (2025). Should Venezuela be considered part of “Gunboat diplomacy”? LinkedIn.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/should-venezuela-considered-part-gunboat-diplomacy-history-repeating-w1jpe

Shatz, H. J., Hafner, M., Aoki, N., Dortmans, P., Heath, T. R., & Quimbre, F. (2025). Economic deterrence in a China contingency. RAND Corporation.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4022-1.html

The White House. (2025). National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).