🇺🇲 From TPS to Trade Wars: Navigating Honduras’ 2025 Elections Amid U.S.–China Rivalry
Jose Adán Gutiérrez, Senior Fellow, MSI². Rafael Marrero, Founder and CEO, MSI²
Key Takeaways
• November 2025 elections will determine whether Honduras continues under Libre’s reformist but scandal-affected governance, shifts to conservative National Party leadership, or elects a centrist reformist alternative—each with distinct implications for domestic policy, regional alliances, and ties with the United States and China.
• China’s influence has expanded rapidly since Honduras recognized the PRC in 2023, making foreign policy alignment a central electoral and strategic issue; election outcomes could either deepen Beijing’s foothold or recalibrate toward U.S.-aligned positions.
• Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for roughly 80,000 Hondurans in the United States is set to expire pending court outcomes; how Washington manages TPS, alongside security and economic cooperation, will heavily influence Honduras’ stability and its foreign policy orientation.
• U.S. policy toward Honduras must balance firm expectations on anti-corruption, migration management, and security cooperation with pragmatic flexibility—particularly on TPS—to prevent economic destabilization and reduce the appeal of Chinese overtures.
• The U.S. military presence at Soto Cano Air Base remains a cornerstone of bilateral security cooperation, giving Washington significant leverage but also serving as a symbol of sovereignty debates in Honduran politics.
Executive Summary
Honduras is approaching a pivotal political moment. The November 2025 elections follow four turbulent years under President Xiomara Castro, whose 2021 victory ended 12 years of National Party dominance. Castro’s administration has achieved gains in security, healthcare, and foreign investment—particularly through engagement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—but has been marred by corruption scandals and political polarization.
This paper examines Honduras’ political evolution from the 2009 coup to the present, profiles the viable candidates for the 2025 election, and assesses what each outcome would mean for domestic governance, regional relations, and ties with both the United States and China. It also analyzes key issues—corruption, migration, human rights, drug trafficking—and the enduring U.S. military presence at Soto Cano. The expiration of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Hondurans in the U.S. is highlighted as a critical economic and diplomatic concern.
1. Introduction
Honduras’ domestic and foreign policy trajectory is in flux. The November 2025 elections will determine whether the country continues its current reformist path or pivots toward conservative restoration. The outcome will have direct implications for U.S.–Honduras relations, regional alignments in Central America, and the strategic balance between Washington and Beijing in the hemisphere (Americas Quarterly, 2024; World Bank, 2024).
2. Historical Context (2009–2021)
The June 2009 coup d’état ousted President Manuel “Mel” Zelaya, leading to 12 years of National Party (PN) rule under Porfirio Lobo and Juan Orlando Hernández, known for his initials as JOH (Booth et al., 2023). This era saw increasing state capture by organized crime; U.S. prosecutors described Hernández’ Honduras as a “narco-state” (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ], 2024). Hernández’s controversial 2017 re-election, facilitated by a constitutional reinterpretation, sparked nationwide protests and was widely condemned by international observers (Freedom House, 2024).
In 2021, Xiomara Castro of the Liberty and Refoundation (Libre) party won the presidency with 51% of the vote, campaigning on anti-corruption, social investment, and democratic restoration (Americas Quarterly, 2024).
3. Developments Since 2021: Castro’s Presidency
3.1 Achievements
Castro’s early actions included extraditing JOH to the U.S., abolishing controversial special economic zones (ZEDEs), and lifting the ban on emergency contraception (Al Jazeera, 2023). GDP grew at an average of 3.8% from 2022 to 2024 (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2024). Homicide rates declined from 38.6 per 100,000 in 2021 to 26.5 in 2024 (Honduras National Violence Observatory, 2025).
3.2 Corruption Scandals
In September 2024, a leaked video showed Carlos Zelaya, the president’s brother-in-law, negotiating a $525,000 payment from the “Los Cachiros” cartel, allegedly for Mel Zelaya’s campaign (Reuters, 2024). The scandal led to high-profile resignations, including the defense minister, and severely damaged Libre’s anti-corruption narrative (Insight Crime, 2025).
3.3 Extradition Treaty Dispute
In August 2024, Castro announced plans to terminate Honduras’s extradition treaty with the U.S. following criticism by U.S. Ambassador Laura Dogu of a meeting between Honduran military leaders and a sanctioned Venezuelan general (Al Jazeera, 2024). By February 2025, under domestic and international pressure, she reversed course, agreeing to extend the treaty with sovereignty “safeguards” (AP News, 2025).
4. Viable Candidates and Electoral Scenarios
4.1 Rixi Moncada — Libre Party
• Domestic Policy: Continuation of social welfare programs and state-led development projects.
• Regional Policy: Closer ties with Venezuela and Nicaragua.
• U.S. Relations: Cooperative on security, resistant on migration enforcement.
• China Relations: Deepen PRC engagement in infrastructure and trade.
4.2 Nasry “Papi” Asfura — National Party
• Domestic Policy: Market-friendly reforms, potential rollback of some Libre social programs.
• Regional Policy: Closer ties with pro-U.S. governments like Guatemala.
• U.S. Relations: Align with Washington on migration enforcement and anti-narcotics.
• China Relations: Possible reconsideration of PRC recognition in favor of Taiwan.
4.3 Salvador Nasralla — Partido Salvador de Honduras (PSH)
• Domestic Policy: Reformist, anti-corruption focus.
• Regional Policy: Pragmatic, centrist.
• U.S. Relations: Strong cooperation on governance and security.
• China Relations: Neutral, pragmatic approach to investment.
5. Key Issues in the 2025 Election
5.1 Corruption and Governance
Libre’s stalled efforts to establish the UN-backed International Commission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (CICIH) (United Nations, 2025) and ongoing scandals will be central in the campaign.
5.2 Migration, U.S. Policy, and TPS Loss
President Castro has opposed U.S. mass deportation initiatives, calling them “an affront to human dignity” (La Prensa, 2025). TPS for approximately 80,000 Hondurans in the U.S. is at risk; expiration could cut remittances by $1 billion annually (World Bank, 2024). As of August 2025, TPS holders remain protected and can work legally in the U.S. until November 18, pending further legal developments.
Quick Facts: Migration and Remittances
5.3 Geopolitical Considerations of TPS
• U.S. leverage: Washington could tie TPS decisions to cooperation on migration, anti-narcotics, or PRC alignment.
• China factor: A Libre-led government might offset remittance losses by deepening PRC engagement.
5.4 Drug Trafficking
While drug seizures rose 20% from 2022 to 2024 (Honduran Armed Forces, 2025), entrenched political protection for traffickers remains a concern (Insight Crime, 2025).
6. U.S. Military Presence in Honduras
Soto Cano Air Base hosts Joint Task Force–Bravo, with 500–1,000 U.S. personnel supporting counter-narcotics, disaster relief, and regional training (U.S. Southern Command, 2025). The base is valued by both militaries but politically sensitive; Castro has occasionally used its presence as leverage in disputes over U.S. migration policy.
7. Regional Electoral Context
• Guatemala: Bernardo Arévalo’s reformist presidency aligns with U.S. anti-corruption goals (Reuters, 2023).
• El Salvador: Nayib Bukele’s security gains are tempered by democratic backsliding.
• Nicaragua: Daniel Ortega’s authoritarian regime remains aligned with Libre’s foreign policy orientation.
• Costa Rica: Stable, pro-U.S. democracy under President Rodrigo Chaves. One of the few countries in the region to uphold diplomatic relations with Taiwan, resisting PRC influence.
8. Policy Implications
For Honduras:
• Expedite CICIH establishment to bolster anti-corruption credibility.
• Develop contingency plans for TPS expiration to mitigate economic shock.
For the United States:
• Maintain security cooperation while pressing for governance reforms.
• Manage a phased TPS transition to avoid destabilizing Honduras’ economy.
For Regional Actors:
• Coordinate migration policy with U.S. and regional partners.
• Align anti-corruption and governance initiatives for collective impact.
Conclusion
Honduras’ November 2025 elections will set the tone for the nation’s governance, foreign policy, and role in a shifting regional landscape. Whether the country continues under Libre, returns to National Party leadership, or elevates a reformist alternative, the decisions made in Tegucigalpa will reverberate well beyond its borders.
China’s presence has already deepened since Honduras recognized the PRC in 2023, with infrastructure, trade, and technology agreements expanding Beijing’s economic footprint. If the post-election government feels isolated from Washington—particularly in the wake of contentious issues such as mass deportations, TPS termination, or perceived U.S. disengagement—China will be well-positioned to step in with financial incentives and political support. This could tilt Honduras more firmly into Beijing’s sphere of influence, complicating U.S. strategic interests in Central America.
A deft balancing act by the United States is essential. By coupling firm expectations on anti-corruption, security cooperation, and migration management with pragmatic flexibility—particularly on TPS—Washington can help stabilize Honduras’ economy, protect millions from economic shock, and maintain its role as Tegucigalpa’s most vital partner. Such an approach would preserve U.S. influence, mitigate the drivers of irregular migration, and reduce the appeal of Chinese overtures. This strategy, if applied consistently, can help ensure that Honduras remains anchored to democratic governance and a cooperative regional security architecture, rather than becoming another node in Beijing’s expanding Latin American network of influence.
References
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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).