STRATEGIC REPORT: Current State of Venezuela's Air Defense System

Jesús Romero. Co-Founder & Senior Fellow, MSI²

Executive Summary: Venezuela's air defense is in critical condition: over 60% of the radar fleet is non-operational, combat aviation flies sporadically, and drug trafficking networks exploit uncovered areas.

External assistance efforts from China and Iran have been partial and selective, aimed at protecting political power rather than national sovereignty. (Control Ciudadano, 2020; Infodefensa, 2023)

MSI² Operational Capacity Rating (0–10): 2/10
Radar Coverage: 1/10
Interception/Alert Capability: 2/10
Internal Morale/Cohesion: 3/10
External Support: 4/10

Transparency Statement

This report relies on direct testimonies and verified communications from active personnel within the Bolivarian Air Force, highlighting operational decay and manipulation within the air defense system. Informants' identities are withheld for security reasons.

Their inputs have been cross-checked with technical data, maintenance records, international reports, and reliable open sources. The aim is to shed light on a critical situation jeopardizing regional stability and hemispheric security.

Operational Assessment

More than 50% of JYL-1 and JY-11B radars are out of service due to a lack of spare parts. SU-30MK2 operations are severely restricted. Only a few F-16s remain operational, and AT-27s are used exclusively for training. The K-8W Karakorum fleet operates at less than 30%, lacks air-to-air radar, and is symbolically used for anti-drug missions. Air coverage is limited to Caracas and La Orchila, areas directly under political high command protection. (Infodefensa, 2023; Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2022)

Criminal Connections

The Cartel of the Suns has infiltrated entities like CODAI, ZODI, and REDI, coordinating to manipulate radar shutdown times, facilitating illicit aircraft passage undetected. The YV3217 Citation crash, resulting in the deaths of the CODAI commander’s wife and daughter, along with several Air Force sergeants' defections, reveals deep internal fractures and complete politicization of the defense apparatus. (Farah & Berríos, 2021; InSight Crime, 2023)

Credit: Adobe Stock- Standard license on file.

Foreign Interference

China has reduced technical support to a minimum, providing spare parts only through civilian intermediaries. Since 2020, Iran has taken a more active role, supplying Mohajer-6 drones, electronic warfare technicians, and aerial surveillance systems. However, their intervention has solely reinforced the regime's defensive ring in Caracas and La Orchila, without restoring the national defense system functionality. (International Crisis Group, 2022; Qods Aviation Industries, 2023)

Transnational Complicity

Planes from Venezuela continue landing on clandestine runways in Mexico, with local authorities' collaboration or tolerance. This cooperation has established an air corridor Venezuela-Mexico as the primary route for cocaine transport to North America, according to multiple intelligence reports from the DEA, State Department, and UNODC. (U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 2023; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023)

Assessment of Iranian Drones

Venezuela operates Iranian Mohajer-2 drones (locally known as "Harpy") and Mohajer-6, used exclusively for surveillance missions in Caracas, Maracaibo, and La Orchila. Although some models can carry ammunition, their use has been limited to observation and internal propaganda operations. The fleet suffers from low technical availability and is not integrated into CODAI’s network, unable to cover key operational zones like Zulia or Apure. (Qods Aviation Industries, 2023)

Internal and External Threat Capability

Venezuela currently lacks any military projection capability abroad. Combat aviation is limited, the Bolivarian Navy is non-operational, and ground forces lack strategic mobility. There is no logistical capability to deploy troops outside the country or sustain operations beyond the Caracas-Maracay axis. In terms of internal repression, the regime relies heavily on intelligence, the Bolivarian Militia, FAES, and irregular groups like collectives or armed elements of the Tren de Aragua. An organized opposition uprising with aviation or external support could easily overcome regime defenses in many regions, except Caracas. The regime's survival depends on political repression, not conventional military power.

Strategic Conclusion

Venezuela's air defense system is compromised by political and criminal interests. Foreign aid only strengthens specific regime enclaves and fails to restore genuine institutional capabilities. The country remains vulnerable to airspace violations, drug trafficking penetration, and regional collapse under organized military pressure. With an overall rating of 2/10, the defense apparatus requires deep institutional cleansing and a complete strategic redesign to once again serve national sovereignty. (Congressional Research Service, 2023; Romero & Tochterman, 2024)

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References

Alvarado, J., & Ramírez, C. (2021). Las rutas del silencio: Militarización y narcotráfico en Venezuela. Editorial Témis.

Brookings Institution. (2021). The Maduro regime and transnational organized crime. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-maduro-regime-and-transnational-organized-crime/

Control Ciudadano. (2020). Informe sobre la situación operativa del sistema de defensa aérea venezolano. https://controlciudadano.org/documento/informe-especial-sistema-defensa-aerea/

Congressional Research Service. (2023). Venezuela: Background and U.S. relations (CRS Report R44841). https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44841

Farah, D., & Berríos, C. (2021). Estado criminal: Venezuela y el Cartel de los Soles (Informe IASC). International Assessment and Strategy Center. https://www.strategycenter.net/reports

Human Rights Watch. (2022, October 6). Venezuela: Military abuse and impunity persist. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/06/venezuela-military-abuse-and-impunity-persist

Infodefensa. (2023, April 11). Aeronaves operativas en la Fuerza Aérea Venezolana: Análisis actualizado. https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/3860634/venezuela-aviones-fuerza-aerea-operatividad-2023

Infodefensa. (2024, January 9). K-8W venezolanos: Balance de operatividad y empleo real. https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/4322141/k8w-fab-entrenamiento-venezuela

InSight Crime. (2023, May 25). Venezuela’s airspace: A highway for cocaine. https://insightcrime.org/news/venezuela-airspace-cocaine-highway/

International Crisis Group. (2022). Broken defenses: Venezuela’s failing military structures (Informe No. 91). https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/broken-defenses

Jane’s Defence Weekly. (2022, November 21). Venezuelan Air Force faces SU-30 readiness crisis.

Miami Herald. (2024, March 19). Jet linked to narco traffickers crashes off Venezuela’s coast. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article286552169.html

Qods Aviation Industries. (2023). Mohajer-6 UAV: Technical overview. https://qodsaviation.com/en/products/mohajer-6/

Romero, J., & Tochterman, S. (2024). El vuelo final: La Reina del Aire. Bravo Zulu Publishers.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2023). Global report on cocaine 2023. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/cocaine-report.html

U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2023, October 18). Treasury sanctions actors supporting Iran’s UAV exports (Press release JY1752). https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1752

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. (2023). 2023 National drug threat assessment. https://www.dea.gov/documents/2023/03/28/2023-national-drug-threat-assessment

U.S. Department of State. (2023). International narcotics control strategy report 2023 (2 vols.). https://www.state.gov/international-narcotics-control-strategy-report/

U.S. Southern Command. (2024, April 16). Posture statement before the House Armed Services Committee. https://www.southcom.mil/Media/Special-Coverage/Posture-Statement/

Venezuelan Military Observatory. (2023). Deserción y corrupción en la FANB: Indicadores y testimonios. https://observatoriofuerzamilitar.org/informes-2023

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).